Muhammad v. Cappellini by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-27-2012 
Muhammad v. Cappellini 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Muhammad v. Cappellini" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1247. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1247 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3993 
___________ 
 
MARC ANTWAIN X. RIVERS MUHAMMAD, SR., 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
VINCENT CAPPELLINI, Court Appointed Counsel;  
LUZERNE COUNTY CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES;  
LUZERNE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ORPHANS’ COURT;  
SUPERIOR COURT PENNSYLVANIA;  
JOHN A. BELLINO, Guardian Ad Litem;  
GERRY LYNN BUTLER, Case Worker;  
THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-10-cv-02374) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 20, 2012 
 
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and STAPLETON, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: March 27, 2012) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
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 Marc Antwain X. Rivers Muhammad, Sr., proceeding pro se, appeals from the 
District Court’s order dismissing his amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2).  For the following reasons, we will affirm.  
I. 
 In November 2010, Muhammad filed a pro se complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania alleging various constitutional 
violations in connection with his parental termination proceedings in the Luzerne County 
Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court Division.  Muhammad named the following 
individuals and entities as defendants: attorney Vincent Cappellini, who was appointed to 
represent him during the termination proceedings; John A. Bellino, who served as his 
son’s guardian ad litem; the Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (LCCYS); the 
Luzerne County Orphans’ Court; the Superior Court of Pennsylvania; and the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania.   
 In the complaint, Muhammad alleged as follows:1
 The plaintiff is the biological father of Alonzo Darrell Tristian Allen 
(Alonzo).  In May of 2002, the plaintiff was incarcerated and Alonzo was 
taken from his biological mother by the Luzerne County Court of Common 
Pleas and CYS.  Alonzo was placed with his mother’s relatives.  The 
plaintiff filed numerous actions challenging the dependency determination 
and seeking to have Alonzo placed with his relatives.  After completing the 
services recommended by CYS, the plaintiff sought contact with his son.   
  
 
                                              
1  This summary is taken from the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation.  
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 Despite the fact that the plaintiff had complied with the directives 
and recommendations of CYS, in March of 2006, CYS filed a petition to 
terminate the parental rights of the plaintiff.  Defendant Cappellini was 
subsequently appointed as counsel to represent the plaintiff during the 
termination of parental rights proceedings.  On June 21, 2007, Judge 
Conahan terminated the parental rights of the plaintiff to Alonzo.   
 
 Defendant Bellino was appointed as the Guardian ad Litem for 
Alonzo but he failed to act in the best interests of Alonzo as he did not 
ensure that the plaintiff received due process during the termination 
proceedings. 
 
 Alonzo was subsequently placed for adoption and has been adopted.  
  
 The plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the termination of his parental 
rights to the Pennsylvania Superior Court and then to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.  On appeal the plaintiff claimed that defendant Cappellini 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  The plaintiff claims that 
defendant Cappellini was ineffective by not presenting evidence to 
contradict the testimony of a psychologist, a psychiatrist and the CYS case 
workers during the termination proceedings.  Neither the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the 
plaintiff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
 
(Report and Recommendation, Dist. Ct. dkt # 6, at pp. 2-4.)   
 Based on these allegations, Muhammad asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 
and 1985, arguing that the defendants had deprived him of his due process and equal 
protection rights, as well as his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  
As relief, Muhammad sought: (1) a judgment declaring that attorney Cappellini had 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel during the termination proceedings; (2) an 
order vacating the state-court order terminating his parental rights, vacating the adoption 
order, and granting him physical and legal custody of Alonzo; and (3) nominal, 
compensatory, and punitive damages.   
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 The Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  
Specifically, the Magistrate Judge determined that Muhammad’s claims were barred 
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is implicated when, in order to grant the federal plaintiff 
the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was 
erroneously entered or must take action that would render that judgment ineffectual.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Magistrate Judge further determined 
that the state-court defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.  
See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa.
 Upon review, the District Court adopted in part and rejected in part the Magistrate 
Judge’s Report and Recommendation.  The District Court agreed that, under the 
, 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that 
judicial defendants are Commonwealth entities entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity).    
Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, it could not vacate the state-court decisions regarding Muhammad’s 
parental rights.2
                                              
2 The District Court also determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded 
the court from issuing a declaratory judgment as to attorney Cappellini’s alleged 
ineffective assistance.  Although Muhammad does not challenge the District Court’s 
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
we note that, insofar as Muhammad alleges that the state courts refused to review the 
claim when he presented it on direct appeal, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not bar 
federal review of it.  See generally Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 
U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  In any event, Muhammad did not have a constitutional right to 
  The District Court also agreed with the Magistrate Judge that the state-
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court defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  In addition, the court 
held that Muhammad’s claim against defendant Bellino was barred under the doctrine of 
judicial immunity, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978), and that his § 
1983 claim against attorney Cappellini could not survive because Cappellini is not a state 
actor, see Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).  However, the District Court 
determined that Muhammad’s remaining claims—a § 1983 claim for damages against 
LCCYS and a § 1985 conspiracy claim for damages against attorney Cappellini and 
LCCYS—could be plausible if supported by more particular facts.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining that dismissal is proper if a party fails to allege 
sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, could “state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face”) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
 Soon thereafter, Muhammad filed an amended complaint asserting conspiracy 
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) and (3), and § 1986.  In the amended complaint, 
Muhammad named as an additional defendant Gerry Lynn Butler, a caseworker with 
LCCYS, and claimed that Butler falsely testified at the termination hearing that 
Muhammad had failed to support Alonzo, and had not completed the drug, alcohol, and 
mental health programs outlined in his Family Service Plan.  According to Muhammad, 
, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
Accordingly, the court granted Muhammad leave to amend his complaint.   
                                                                                                                                                  
assistance of counsel in his termination proceedings.  See Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss 
Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 1980) (explaining that a civil litigant, unlike a 
criminal defendant, does not have a constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel).    
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he sent documentation from the prison that he had completed these programs to attorney 
Cappellini, but Cappellini failed to produce them at the hearing.  Muhammad also alleged 
that the Orphans’ Court purposely ignored his briefs.   
 Muhammad claimed that the actions of Butler, Cappellini, Bellino, LCCYS, the 
Orphans’ Court, the Superior Court, and the Supreme Court all stemmed from a 
conspiracy among them to deprive Muhammad of his parental rights.  Muhammad argued 
that the motivation behind this conspiracy was animus against his race and a desire to 
prevent him from raising his son as a Muslim.     
 By order entered September 29, 2011, the District Court dismissed the amended 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  § 1915(e)(2).3
 The District Court then addressed Muhammad’s remaining § 1985 conspiracy 
claims against Butler, attorney Cappellini, and LCCYS.  The court explained that, in 
order to state a claim under either § 1985(2) or § 1985(3), Muhammad was required to 
plead that an actual agreement existed among the parties.  
  The court considered the new allegations 
contained therein and again held that the state-court defendants were entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, and that defendant Bellino was entitled to judicial immunity.   
See Startzell v. City of Phila.
                                              
3 In addition to filing an amended complaint, Muhammad also filed a motion for 
reconsideration challenging the District Court’s dismissal of his first complaint.  The 
District Court considered the motion for reconsideration together with the amended 
complaint, and held that Muhammad had failed to demonstrate a change in the 
controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a clear error of law or fact in its dismissal 
of the disputed claims.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  Muhammad does not challenge the 
District Court’s reconsideration ruling on appeal.   
, 
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533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).  He did not, however, allege any specific facts 
indicating that Butler, attorney Cappellini, and LCCYS communicated with one another, 
or otherwise came to an agreement to conspire against him.  As a result, he failed to plead 
enough facts to state a plausible claim for conspiracy under §1985.  See Iqbal
 Muhammad now appeals from the District Court’s order.   
, 129 S. Ct. 
at 1949.    
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Allah v. Seiverling
 Here, the District Court fairly construed the allegations set forth in the pro se 
pleading and correctly concluded that Muhammad failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.  
, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).   
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  We 
refer the parties to the District Court’s thorough opinion, which we have no need to 
summarize here.   Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.4
                                              
4 To the extent that Muhammad requests that the appeals docketed in this Court at 
Nos. 11-4187 and 11-4632 be consolidated with the present appeal, we note that 
Muhammad previously made this request by motion and that the Clerk of Court denied 
the motion by order entered January 31, 2012.    
   
